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A SELECTIVE DEFENCE OF
TOLSTOY'S WHAT IS ART?
Todd R. Long--University of Swansea
or many years, Tolstoy's What is Art? has been dismissed by some as
the fanatical diatribe of a man obsessed with morality, and demonized
by others for castigating as "bad art" many oftheir most cherished works.
Though Tolstoy deserves some of this criticism (for he is sometimes
inconsistent in the application of his theory), contemporary
commentators continue to take for granted certain criticisms about
Tolstoy's theory of art, even though he can be defended against man?' of
the often-repeated negative conclusions they take his theory to imply. In
this paper I want to defend Tolstoy against three specific claims made by
Robert Wilkinson in his essay "Art, Emotion and Expression": (1)
Artists must have lived the emotions their works convey, (2) moral
content guarantees aesthetic success, and (3) the art object itself is not
valuable. Because Tolstoy is sometimes inconsistent in applying his own
theory, whichever conclusions one draws from What is Art? will depend
on what one takes Tolstoy to hold as fundamentally important in his
theory. I hope to show that a proper reading of Tolstoy renders his theory
much more cogent than Wilkinson seems to think it does.

F

Artists must have lived the emotions their works convey
Wilkinson lists what he takes to be Tolstoy's three necessary conditions
for an object to be counted as a work of art, one of which he puts this
way: "its maker has him/herself lived through the feelings thus
aroused. " 2 Elsewhere Wilkinson says that, for Tolstoy, "in any art
worthy ofthe name, the artist must have lived through the feelings she or
he wishes to express ...." 3 On what he takes to follow from Tolstoy's
theory, Wilkinson rules out an artist's imagined experiences as being
proper sources of content for artworks, for he says that, contra Tolstoy,
there is no "simple correlation between w~at has been live~ through and
what is artistically convincing: many wnters report, for mstance, that
1

Colin Lyas (1997:59-66) is one notable exception to the critics who continue to assume
that Tolstoy's theory of art implies the positions against which I defend him in this

paper.
Wilkinson (1992: 186).
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characters they have created seem to. take a direction of their own, and
undergo experiences the artist can only imagine, but are none the less
4
convincing as a result. "
:1
It seems that Wilkinson has not read carefully Tolstoy's passage
about the boy who infects his listeners with the fear he experienced when
encountering a wolf:
Even if the boy had not seen a wolf, but had often been afraid of seeing one;
and, wishing to call up in others the feeling he experienced, invented the
encounter with the wolf, telling it in such a way that through his narrative he
called up in his listeners the same feeling he experienced in imagining the wolf
- this, too, is art. In just the same way, it is art if a man, having experienced in
reality or in imagination the horror of suffering or the delight of pleasure,
expresses these feelings on canvas or in marble in such a way that others are
infected by them. And in just the same way, it will be art if a man has
experienced or imagined the feelings of merriment, joy, sadness, despair~
cheerfulness, dejection, and the transitions between these feelings, and
expresses them in sounds so that listeners are infected by them and experience
them in the same way as he experienced them.5 (my emphasis)
·~
i

It does not take a careful reading of this passage to realize that Tolstoy
allows for writers to include imagined experiences in their work. It seems

very clear to me that what Tolstoy is emphasizing in this passage is not
the artist's lived experience in a narrow sense, comprising only the
artist's active engagement in the world~ rather, Tolstoy is emphasizing
that, whichever experiences an artist has had, lived through or imagined,
what is important in creating art is to be able to infect others with those
same feelings.
,

Moral content guarantees aesthetic success
Wilkinson holds that Tolstoy's subordination of aesthetics to morality
leads to the undesirable consequence that
y
the subject matter of a work of art largely or wholly determines its aesthetic
merit or demerit. That is, for anyone holding the Tolstoyan premise, it follows
that the presence of whatever subject-matter is ideologically approved of
guarantees success in a work of art, and its absence or contradiction guarantees
indifference or failure. 6

Befor~ considering whether or not Tolstoy is open to this charge, I want

to pot_nt out the. carele~s reasoning in Wilkinson's argument. The
penultimate premtse In hts argument is this: The subject matter of a
work of art largely or wholly determines its aesthetic merit or demerit.
4
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N~\V ~!le· ofthe optiOt:J.S available to us here is that the subject matter of a
work of art largely determines its aesthetic merit or demerit. But for the
subject··matter largely to determine an artwork's aesthetic merit or
detp.eri,(.requires ar:J~a.st one other feature, beside the subject matter,
ent~ri~g ·in to take up ·the space that "largely" does not completely filL
Thus;. i~ccording to 't}Vilkinson's own premise, it is possible that an
app~oyed of subject~matter does not guarantee an artwork's success on
the gr~~nd ·that another feature, or features, is lacking in its role for
deten:nining whether_or I,lOt an object is successful as a work ofart.
.,-. ..".. Beyond this forinal complaint, I want to argue that, for Tolstoy,
infectiousness, no(subject matter, is the crucial factor in determining the
aesthetic success of an artwork. In chapter 15 of What is Art? Tolstoy
says;· '~One indisputable sign that distinguishes true art from counterfeit is
the. infectiousness of. art." 7 This infectiousness involves an artist's
conveying feelings;tctan audience. Furthermore, an artwork is more or
less·it1fectious depending upon three conditions: its particularity, clarity,
and the artist's sincerity, all of which have to do with the way in which a
feeli~g .is conveyed~.~ Tolstoy goes so far as to say, "the degree of
8
infectiousness is also. the only measure of artistic worth". He feels so
strongly .about this that no fewer than four times in three pages does he
expressly state that 'these three conditions of infectiousness, which alone
dete1.ntine an artwork's aesthetic merit, have nothing at all to do with
·r~ . :.
subject matter:
r~" :~,:·The presence in diff(!ring degrees of the three conditions - particularity, clarity
,t ...):ru.t( sinceri?'·-:- dete:min~s the worth of the object of art, regardless of its
'·. content. ... (my emphas1s)
~~- Th~s~. are the· thre~ i conditions the presence of which distinguishes art from
~~:)t_~,. artistic countelfeits; 'and at the same·time determines the worth of any work of
1t.~;art regardless' of_~t~, fOntent. ... 10 (my emphasis)
"·:,·:,The stronger th~ infection, the better the art is as art, regardless ofits content
11
~ t.\·~.: that is, independ~ntly of the worth of the feelings [the artist] conveys....
·• ··' : ·.. (my emphasis) :('. \..·
lf,_·;
.- ~-- ·.)'J
.··.
•
. _, :...rhus· art is ·distiri'gtiished from non-art, and the worth of art as art ts
~.·;., . determined, regardless of it~ content, tha~ is, independently of whether it
2 (my emphasis)
. r •. conveys good or.bad feelings.
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Toisi~~-does not ~erfti~n this principle in i,~olation, for ~e has already
appealed· to it in chapter 12 where he says, If the work 1s good as art,
v. . . . ;' \ ,
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then the feeling expressed by the artist is convered
to others, ~egardless
1
of whether the work is moral or immora/.'' (my emp~asts). Th~s,
Tolstoy thinks that the aesthetic success of a work of art ts. d~e to t!s
infectiousness, not to its subject matter. I conc_lude that Wtlkmson IS
wrong to claim that, on Tolstoy's theory, the subJect matter of a work of
art determines its aesthetic merit as art.
Wilkinson makes a related claim, which he bases on Tolstoy's view
that art should be good in its content, that whether or not a subject "is
treated in an artistically satisfying way is irrelevant, for example, it is
unimportant whether the characters are credible, or the style pleasing to
read and so on. These features, which are aesthetic virtues, are on this
view of no account in determining the value of the work of art as a work
of art." 14 If, as Tolstoy has repeated numerous times, the infectiousness
of a work of art, not its subject matter, detennines its aesthetic worth,
then Wilkinson is also wrong to charge Tolstoy with downplaying
absolutely the aesthetic merits of an artwork. For Tolstoy, the
infectiousness of a work of art is brought about by means of the artist's
artistic talent to convey feelings. In fact, it is only by means of the artist's
artistic talent that these feelings are conveyed. For Tolstoy, art conveys
our feelings to one another just as language conveys our thoughts to one
another. We must keep in mind that Tolstoy's inventory of what can
count as a work of art is much larger than the traditional categories:
Tolstoy wants to include such items as simple stories, lullabies, and
church services as potential works of art. Any human activity in which
someone conveys feelings by means of external signs can count as art. 15
But regardless of which items can count as art under Tolstoy's
theory, Wilkinson has taken Tolstoy to have subsumed aesthetic virtues
under moral ones in such a way that a work's moral qualities (which deal
with subject matter) determine its aesthetic merit. Wilkinson has missed
Tolstoy's dualism here, for Tolstoy distinguishes between an artwork's
aesthetic merits and its moral merits. T .J. Diffey points out that Tolstoy
agrees with the proponents of"art for art's sake" that to judge an artwork,
as art, is not to consider its moral content. Diffey says, "In What is Art? .
. . artistic merit is held to consist solely in infectiousness or
expressiveness,
and not in the moral character of the content of the
16
~or~." Furthermore, says Diffey, "Tolstoy's argument in "What is Art?
1mpl~e~ that we can ask .t~o ·logically distinct questions of any work of
art: Is It go?d a~ a~ and ~s Its con~ent morally good. ,~ 7
.
Now tfWilktnson Is so obviously wrong on this issue, then how is
It that he came to make the strong accusation that, for Tolstoy, it is
13

Tolstoy (1995:94).
Wilkinson (1992:184).
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:,

i~e'~~ant whether an artwor~ is'~esthetically satisfying? Wilkinson does

not gtve hi~ reasons in his essay, bu(p~rhaps··:,;we can understand ·how
sol!leone might come to th~n~ that Tolstoy implies such a position. Iri
chapter 16, Tolstoy begins._!9.. explain~; ~is yie\Y that art, to be morally
~ood? must meet one of two.~~quirel!le!}ts::' either it must unite people i!l
feehngs that come from the:consctousness of,sonship to God and the
18
brotherhood ofmen" , or in.universal;simple.everyday feelings. Tolstoy
says, ':'Only these two kind~ ~f feelin&s constitute in our time the subject
m.atter of art that is good in content" (my emphasis). Tolstoy goes on to
criticise .harshly many acce'p ted works
art as not meeting either of
these criteria. These he labels ~'bad aft". But what is crucially important
to. keep_ in mind is that Tolstoy's labelling them as ubad art" is not ·an
aesthetic judgement, but rather it is a moral one.
.. .·
<;n~~owever, Tolstoy doe~\ not clearly maintain this distinction from
chapter ··16 onward. Though '·he never~ expressly denies the distinction
between good and bad aesthetic qualities, on the one hand, and good and
bad moral qualities, on the ~ther, he does seem to conflate the two types
ofqualities. when he names examples 'of"bad·art" in chapter 16. Here he
d~nounc.es Beethoven, Schumann, Wagner; Dante, Shakespeare, and
others·as -having created immoral art (that is, ·art that conveys feelings
exclusive to the idle rich, that· promotespatriotic or churchlyfeelings or
perverse, sensual feelings). The problem· is that Tolstoy uses qualities he
has· heretofore treated as producing "counterfeit art" to show that these
so~called artists have created ·'~bad art". For instance, he criticises many
accepted composers for having created "artificial and exceptio1'utlly
complex music". 20 And ;dri his discussion \of Beethoven's Ninth
Symphony, though he does :list reasonsthafproperly fit under his theory
for what counts as "bad art'~,--, he also. has. this to say: " .. .1 cannot even
imagine a crowd ofnormal:people wh'o''cotild understand anything in this
lorig, intricate and artificial· work but 'short fragments drowning in a sea
of the incomprehensible. And therefore, 'I must conclude, whether lwill
o·i·no that this work belongs to bad 'i uf"21 ' But in chapter 11 he lists
work~ that are complex 'and incolllpreherisi~le as falling under the
COncept Of diversion, which falls. under the Category Of C:OUf1:terfeit art.
Herein is one of Tolstoy's fundamental problems, and tt mtght help us to
see how it is that many commentators -on_,Tolstoy have charged him _.with
no reaL concern for an artwork's aesthetic. qualities. In his examples,
Tolstoy does not consistently~ apply h.i~ dis~,inctio~ bet':'een "c?un~erfe.it
art'~ and "bad art" but the distinction ts :necessary If he ts to mamtatn hts
clear emphasis upon the distiric~ion between an a~w~rk's .aes~h~tic ~!ld
morat virtUes. And it is clear that he wants to matntatn thts _dtstmctton,

of
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for just after his evaluation of Beethoven's Ninth, Tolstoy summarizes
his position about how works are to be evaluated:
Whatever the object that passes for a work of art, and however it is praised by
people, in order to find out its worth it is necessary to apply .to. it the ques~on
of whether the object belongs to genuine art or to the arttstic counterfeits.
Having recognized a given object, based on the token of infectiousness for at
least a small circle of people, as belonging to the realm of art, it is necessary,
based on the general token of accessibility~ to decide the next question: does
the work belong to bad, exclusive art, opposed to the religious consciousness
22
of our time, or to Christian art which unites people?

Tolstoy then argues that society should encourage only those works
belonging both to the catego:ry of "genuine art'' and to the catego:ry of
"Christian art", but again, this is a moral injunction. I think the moral
fervour that informs so much of Tolstoy's writing has led him into
inconsistency in this area, but I see no reason to think that his
inconsistencies should alter our view of his fundamental emphasis upon
the worth of the aesthetic qualities of an artwork in producing
infectiousness. A passage from chapter 12 should be enough to refute
Wilkinson's claim:
A musical performance is art and can infect only when the sound is neither
higher nor lower than it ought to be - that is, the infinitely small centre of the
required note must be played - and it must have exactly the necessary duration,
and the intensity of the sound must be neither stronger nor weaker than is
necessary. The least deviation in the pitch of the sound one way or the other,
the least lengthening or shortening of the duration, and the least strengthening
or weakening of the sound as compared with what is required, destroys the
perfection of the performance, and consequently the infectiousness of the
work. ... It is the same in all the arts: a little bit lighter, a little bit darker, a
little bit higher, lower, to the right, to the left- in painting; a little bit weaker or
stronger in intonation, a little bit too early or too late - in dramatic art; in
poetty - a little bit too much said, or not said, or exaggerated, and there is no
infection. Infection is achieved only when and in so far as the artist finds those
infinitely small moments ofwhich the work of art is composed.23

The art object itself is not valuable
~ilkinson claims that ac~or~ing to Tolstoy's theory, the art object itself
IS . W?rthless - all that Is Important is the transmitting of feelings.
Wtlkmson says
·
•;

22
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The ~?~l?f art i~- to .~o~vey feeling type X, and if two art objects, A and B both
do this equally well; then it will be a matter of indifference which I encounter
or, indeed, if one of-them is lost. But this is at variance with the way in which ·
work~ o~ a!f are th~u~t of. They are usually regarded as being in an important
~ay mdiVtdual or uruqu,e. . . and the loss of any is the loss of something
rrreplaceable. Wha~ i~ crucial is the way in which each work is expressive: if
this.w~r~ not so, they_~ould be substitutable the one for the other without loss,
but tlley are not. To,gtve one example: there are a number of pieces of music
dah?g from roughly th~ tum of the century which are "farewells to life", for
example the Ninth· Syinphony of Bruckner or the Tenth of Mahler. If Tolstoy is
right; it i.s unimportant if one of these works is lost, but to say this is to see at
once that it is false. ·The reason for the falsehood lies in the fact that in each
ca~~ ~ the poigmmpy;is :'embodied in a unique fashion, and the uniqueness is
constituted by the special combination of aesthetic properties employed in each
cas~. Ally theory.of aesthetic expression must acknowledge that the vehicle of
expression - the ': particular work of art itself - makes an ineliminable
co~tribution to the expression. 24
·
·... -. :~.~.\ ..'

- ' ,., ·~ '

or

Either Wi~kinson has \no,iread carefuily chapters 9-12 of What is Art?,
he has misinterpreted certain features of Tolstoy's theory, for I can show
that Tolstoy can plead ,'.'not guilty" successfully to every one of these
charges:. Wilkinson's ~ Claim here depends upon the assumption that, for
Tolstoy, the particular.form or expression of an artwork is irrelevant--all
25
that is relevant is the conveying of a certain type of feeling. I want to
argue that :·.0) Tolstoy's conception of infectiousness involves the
conveying of a particular feeling in such a way that the feeling conveyed
cannot be divorced from the fonn the artwork takes, and (2) the feelirig
expressed.·in~any particular work of art could not be expressed in any
other work.~·- ·._,. . ~·", ···· .," ·
··
Tolstoy.says iha~ , ~he most important of the conditions promoting
infectiousness, namely .sincerity, "will force the artist to find a clear
expressiohofthe.feeling.he wishes to convey". 26 Tolstoy is emphatic that
the feelings convey5!.d :~; _in art are both new and particular: "The
..··

. _,_,.
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Wilkinson (1992) 185. : !, ··( ._ ·.•
.
I suspectthat part of the'p!.o~lem with Wilkinson's analysis is a misunderstanding of
the nature ·o f the feelings th.at Tolstoy says are conveyed by art. It is clear from the :
above quote that Wilkinsor1thinks Tolstoy's conception of the feelings conveyed by
art involve feeling types. But Tolstoy emphasises the particularity of the feelings
expressed by art. T.J. Diffey (1985:28-29) sheds some light on this matter with regard ·
to type-token distinctions ,in art· See also Colin Lyas, who says, "Two works can
.·
"convey the same thing" ,in the sense of the same general sort of thing, love of money,
say, while not conveying·the same thing in the sense of a particular form that love of ··
·
money ~ take. Why s~o~.ld, we saddle Tolstoy with the former and implausible
view?" (1997:63-64): '· : .· ·
26
.
.. •'" ! ' ·'
Tolstoy (1995: 122). · · ..r " .•
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consequence of true art is the introduction of a new feeling into everyday
life ...." 27 Elsewhere he says
·
The more particular the feeling conveyed, the more strongly does it affe~t the
perceiver. The perceiver experiences the greater pleasure ~e ~or~ parttcular
the state of mind into which he is transferred. . . . If the artist IS smcere, then
he will express his feeling as he has perceived it. And since each man is unlike
28
.
all others, this feeling will be particular for all other men. ..

Thus, Tolstoy thinks that the particular feeling an artist w~shes to convey,
since it is the artist's particular feeling, will be expressed tn a way that no
other artist could express it 29 In chapters 9-12, where Tolstoy discusses
· the feelings conveyed by art, he says
... the only true work of art is one that conveys a new feeling not experienced
by people before. As a by-product of thinking is only a product of thinking
when it conveys new observations and thoughts, and does not repeat what is
already known, in exactly the same way a work of art is only a work of art
when it introduces a new feeling (however insignificant) into the general usage
of human life. 30 .
.

Numerous times Tolstoy mentions these new feelings that genuine art
conveys.31 We will go wrong if we take him to imply that these new
feelings are absolutely novel, fur he mentions several times that the
feelings we have when we attend to genuine art mar: be, as it were,
feelings we have had before but were unable to express. 2
.
So what is it that is new about the feelings genuine art expresses?
What is the nature of this newness? What is new comes through the
27

Tolstoy (1995:150).
Tolstoy (1995:121-122).
29
Diffey says that he takes Tolstoy to hold "that this artist expresses feelings which no
other artist could have expressed (different artists, different feelings)" (1985:28). In a
related vein, David Whewell writes that one of the three conditions required for
Tolstoy's idea of infectiousness, namely the individuality or particularity of the
feelings conveyed, "makes it improbable that exactly the same effects could be
produced in some other way" (1995:431). See also Colin Lyas, who remarks that
Tolstoy's explanation of the infection of music (quoted above, p. 7) suggests "that for
Tolstoy there was nothing to be expressed that could be expressed equally well in
another way" (1997:64).
30
Tolstoy ( 1995:59).
31
See Tolstoy (1995: 59, 60, 85, 88, 94-95, 98).
,
32
_For ex~mpl:, Tolstoy says, "Usually, when a person receives a truly artistic
1mpress10n, It seems to him that he knew it all along, only he was unable to express it"
(1995:81)_. Elsewh~re he says, "The chief peculiarity of the feeling is that the perceiver
merges w1th the artist to such a degree that it seems to him that the perceived object
has b~n ~ade, not by someone else, but by himself, an"~ that everything expressed by
the Object lS exactly what he has long been wanting to express" (1995: 121).
28
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partic~,lar wayi!l 'Yhich .!~e fe~ling is expressed. In chapter 11, Tolstoy

says; an art:tst_Ic tmpresston ts an infection, it works only when the
auth<:>r has htms~lf experienced some feeling and conveys it in his own
way, not when he conveyssomeone else's feeling as it was conveyed to
3
hi~" ~ (my emphasis). He ·c()ntinues this idea in chapter 12: "A young
man prod':lces a work of_af!-;·expressingit in his own particular fashion,
as any artts~ does, t~e feelmgs he has experienced"34 (my emphasis). He
echoes the 1dea.agam where he states the essence of art for the artist:
35
"th~ manifestation of feeling in his own peculiar .fashion"
(my
emphasis). What Tolstoy· is· reacting to in these chapters is what he takes
to be. ~he ess~~~e .of counter~eit a~: artists' ·imi~atin§, borrowing, and
repeattng earher themes, poetic subjects, and the hke. 3 He suggests that
genuine artists ·express their feelings through art in original ways such
that · it is possible that perceivers of their art might recognize both
completely new expressions of feelings ·and feelings they have felt
before:
.
. · ~:.., ~ .
"' ; i ·· Before I explain how. this works I want to summarize the argument
in this section' up to this :point For Tolstoy, the essence of art is the
cottveying of } an artist's _:feelings through external signs such that
something new; comes into the world Jhat is communicated to others.
This: communication involves the concept of infectiousness, which
Tolstoy says causes the perceiver of an artwork to merge with the artist in
such a way that ~ the perceiver can feel ·the ·particular feeling the artist
expresses. Feelings must be clearly expressed in order to be infectious. A
g~J!~ine artist conveys feelings in her OWn. unique way through artistic
means.
;·· ~>f
.'.::.
~::>~·. Commentators on:..T olstoy's theory of art usually get Tolstoy's
theory right up. to this point, but they often .miss the final part of the
argument that ties, the entire theory of infectiousness together and shows
how it is that Tolstoy thinks that works of art are valuable in themselves.
Remember that Tolstoy ·says'that infection "works only when the author
37
has himself experienced some feeling arid conveys it in his ?wn way".
T_his .implies that the new fee lin~ expfesse~ in an art~ork .ts bound up
with the way in which ·:the· arttst's expenenced feeling IS conveyed.
Tolstoy makesthis explicitwhere he speaks of the "chief property of art
wholeness, organicness, in·: which form and content constitute an
- ~\·'; ~
i·;
·: :f ~~ ~
......
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Tolstoy (1995:85).
.
Tolstoy (1995:95-96).
35
Tolstoy (1995:98).
.· . :
36
Tolstoy thinks that one of the possible features of "counterfeit art" is "borrowing
either whole subjects or only separate features from earlier, well-known poetic works
and so reworking them that, with some additions, they represent something new"
.:· ,.. .
(1995:84).
37
.,
. .' j
.;·
Tolstoy (1995:85). .
34
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inseparable whole expressing the feeling ~xperienced by the artist" (my
emphasis). Therefore, for Tolstoy, t~e feehngs expressed ~y art cannot ~e
divorced from the object of art ttself Furthermore, stnce Tolstoy Is
adamant that the expression of feeling conveyed through art "introduces
a new feeling (however insignificant) into the general usage of human
it is the embodiment of a
life" ' 39 it follows that each work of art, since
.
new feeling, is both unique and valuable in ttself as art.
Wilkinson has failed to see Tolstoy's theory of infectiousness in its
entirety. He has attacked Tolstoy for having no concern for the way in
which an artwork is expressive, for thinking that the poignancy of an
artwork is not embodied in a unique way, and for thinking that the
aesthetic properties of an artwork do not make a contribution to the
expression. But, as I have shown, Tolstoy explicitly argues that a
successful work of art involves the unique way in which the work is
expressed and that "form and content constitute an inseparable whole
expressing the feeling experienced by the artist". 40 As for Wilkinson's
example of the two "farewells to life" by Bruckner and Mahler (which he
uses to argue that since they express the same type of feeling it is not
important, on Tolstoy's theory, if one of them is lost), Tolstoy might
respond that what is important about the two works is not that they
express the same type of feeling, but that each artist has expressed his
own particular feeling in his own unique way through the medium of
music. Thus, each piece is individual and unique, and it presents a new
feeling to the world. I conclude that it is false that, for Tolstoy, the
individual work of art itself is of negligible value.
Tolstoy's theory of art is much more complex than many of his
critics take it to be. The moral theme running through What is Art? from
beginning to end seems to have led many commentators to suppose that
Tolstoy must hold the aesthetic qualities of artworks to be of little
account. But this is untrue, for according to Tolstoy, a work of art must
meet the requirements for "genuine arf' (which involves aesthetic
qualities) before it can even be up for consideration as "good art". 41 I
believe that Tolstoy's theory of art contains some real difficulties that
cannot be overcome. without some fairly drastic changes to it. 42
However, the t~ree clatms .I _h~ve defended Tolstoy against in this paper
are represe~tattv~ of the cnttctsms that continue to be propagated to this
day ~ut wh~ch dtsappear un~er close scrutiny. I think I have shown that
W Ilkmson ts clear~y ~on~ m assuming that Tolstoy's theory does not
allow for acts of 1magtnat10n and that it implies that an approved of
38

38

Tolstoy (1995:88).
Tolstoy (1995:59).
40
Tolstoy (1995:88).
41
See Tolstoy (1995: 138).
42
The difficulties I have in mind have mostly to do with Tolstoy's requirement that
works of art be immediately accessible, but this is a subject for another paper.
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subject matter guarantees aesthetic success. Furthermore, I think I have
shown that, .based upon Tolstoy's insistent emphasis upon t4e conveying
of particular, new feelings and his explicit acknowledgement that the
fonn , and :·c·o ntent of an artwork constitute an organic . whole, which
together express the feelings ofthe.artist, Wilkinson is wrong to suppose
that Tolstoy's theory. of art .implies·the worthlessness·, of any art object
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